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REv. 117 (1951). If the various statutory provisions which relate to
common and contract carriers were to be so construed as not to
apply to privately owned passenger automobiles leased for compensation for the private use of the lessee, then no constitutional
question would be raised. The only code section pertinent, in a
positive manner, to the question would be c. 17A, art. 10, § 1. It
in itself is clear and unambiguous and would certainly seem to
indicate that the legislature intended that class "A" registration
and licenses were not to be issued to owners of passenger vehicles
leased or operated for compensation, but that such vehicles were
to be placed in class "U". If the legislative intent is clear, the
courts should give the unambiguous language of a statute full
force and effect, and should not attempt to read into the provision
a meaning which is not intended. Hereford v. Meek, 132 W. Va.
373, 52 S.E.2d 740 (1949); Barnhartv. State Compensation Comm'r,
128 W. Va. 29, 35 S.E.2d 686 (1945); State v. Patachas,96 W. Va.
203, 122 S.E. 545 (1924). To carry out this intent would require
that an owner of an automobile so used pay a higher registration
and license fee than an owner using his automobile in a purely
private manner. This exercise of control is certainly within the
power of the legislature. Reeves v. Wright and Taylor, 310 Ky. 470,
220 S.W.2d 1007 (1949); Hodge Drive It Yourself v. City of Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 (1932). It is merely a question of classification,
seemingly a mandate by the legislature that the owner of a vehicle
used in a commercial manner for his own gain shall pay a higher fee
for such privilege than an owner whose use of his automobile is
purely personal and private. This is no more than a regulation of
the use of the public highways upon a rational and reasonable
basis and does not involve the imposition of any unconstitutional
conditions precedent to such use. Driverless Car Co. v. Armstrong,
81 Colo. 334, 14 P.2d 1098 (1932).
B. F. D.
CRUzaNAL LAw--DEFENSES-INSAN1TY-"NEvw

TEST".-D, with a

prior history of mental disorders, was indicted for housebreaking.
On plea of insanity, it was shown that D was suffering from mental
disturbance though the evidence was not conclusive as to how far
the mental condition had progressed nor as to his capacity to
distinguish right and wrong. Plea of insanity rejected and conviction followed. Held, on writ of error, that sufficient evidence
had been introduced to meet the requirement of the "some evidence rule", which rebuts the presumption of sanity and makes
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proof of sanity part of the prosecution's case. Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
The court establishes a new test for insanity in the District of
Columbia: "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or defect." The term
"disease" is defined as "a condition which is considered capable
of either improving or deteriorating"; and "defect" as "a condition which is not considered capable of improving or deteriorating
and which may be either congenital, or the result of injury, or the
residual effect of a physical or mental disease." This test is
not unlike the New Hampshire rule. See State v. Jones, 50 N.H.
369 (1871). The court leaves the question of insanity to the jury
and formulates a model instruction embodying the new test.
The problem of insanity as a relief for criminal responsibility
has not been without controversy or attention. Though there
is general agreement that a truly insane person should not be
held criminally liable for his acts, as he is lacking of a criminal
intent, the heart of the controversy is the degree of insanity which
will relieve liability.
The Durham test attempts to escape from the narrow confines
of existing tests which define insanity in terms of a particular
symptom, i.e., the right and wrong test as stated in M'Naghten's
Case, 10 C. & F. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843); and the irresistible
impulse test as stated in Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854
(1886). These tests have been criticized as being incompatible
with modern medical knowledge, which envisions insanity as af.
fecting various sections of the mind. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
OF CRIMINAL LAw 521-25 (1947). Under the Durham test the
problem would not seem to be one of discovering insanity, as the
definition seems broad enough to encompass any mental disorder,
but whether the disorder was of sufficient magnitude to relieve
the person of criminal responsibility. The solution proposed is
whether there is a causal connection between the mental disorder
and the criminal act, which would be a jury question. Whether a
jury can or should handle such a question in the absence of more
definite standards has been doubted. WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A
DFXNSE IN CRIMINAL LAW 82-83 (1933).
West Virginia has long followed the right and wrong test.
State v. Harrison,36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892). See McWhorter,
The Test of Criminality as to Acts of Insane Persons-Is It Law,
Barbarism, or Both?, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 213 (1921). Similarly there
has been a firm refusal subsequently to recognize the irresistible
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impulse test, on the ground that an impulse to do harm by one
who knows the difference between right and wrong can not be
irresistible. State v. Painter, 135 W. Va. 106, 63 S.E.2d 86 (1950);
State v. Beckner, 118 W. Va. 430, 190 S.E. 693 (1937); State v.
Fugate, 103 W. Va. 653, 138 S.E. 318 (1927); State v. Evans, 94 W.
Va. 47, 117 S.E. 885 (1923); State v. Barker, 92 W. Va. 583, 115 S.E.
421 (1922); State v. Cook, 69 W. Va. 717, 72 S.E. 1025 (1911); State
v. Maier, 36 W. Va. 757, 15 S.E. 991 (1892). This position has been
criticized as being disharmonious with medical knowledge, and a
departure by the court from the judicial function and an assumption of the role of an expert medical witness. Keedy, Irresistible
Impulse as a Defense in CriminalLaw, 100 U. OF PA. L. RIv. 956,
988-89 (1952).
It would seem that there will continue to be disparities between those courts which attempt to adjust their standard of criminal liability to meet the realities of human behavior as revealed
by the research of medical science which has led to the conclusion,
at least in our time, that man may be a pawn to the intricate and
hidden forces in his own mind; and those courts which adhere
to the historical concept of criminal liability that must be juxtaposed to what has been considered best for a civilized society: that
man must meet a certain minimum standard of conduct regardless
of his infirmities unless the weakness is so marked as to fall within
the strict test for insanity. GutrmACHER 8 WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY
AND THE LAw (1952); HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50-51 (1881).
T. B. M.

DEFAMATION-JURISDICTION OF EqurrY TO ENJOIN.-D circulated

statements, by published letter and word of mouth, that P attorney
was a shyster, deceiver, betrayer of clients, and other defamatory
matter in general. D appealed from a temporary injunction
granted in favor of P by the circuit court. Held, that equity has
no jurisdiction to enjoin the publication of defamatory statements
relating to personality and professional conduct. Kwass v. Kersey,
81 S.E.2d 237 (W. Va. 1954).
Thus there was presented squarely before the court a question
of law frequently debated by some of our greatest legal scholars,
that is, whether a court of equity has jurisdiction to restrain the
publication of defamation as such? Though the debate may continue as to what the law should be, there is no doubt as to what
the cases hold. The decisions are legion that equity will not
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